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ONE NATION? REEXAMINING TRIBAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE MODERN
ERA OF SELF-DETERMINATION**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of sovereign immunity is a remnant of early English common law. 1

** I drafted this piece in the fall of 2009. At that time, Miami Tribe of Oklahoma had entered an appeal,
but the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals court did not release a decision until September 24, 2010. As
predicted in the fall of 2009, this case generated much discussion regarding the status of tribal sovereign
immunity, particularly from various tribal interest groups. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Seneca Telephone
9:41
AM),
14,
2010,
(Oct.
TALK
TURTLE
Tribe
Materials,
v.
Miami
L.M.
Matthew
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/10/14/seneca-telephone-v-miami-tribe-materials/;
Fletcher, Oklahoma Appellate Court Holds that Tribes Have No Immunity in Telecommunications Case,
TURTLE TALK (Sept. 27, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2010/09/27/oklahoma-appellatecourt-holds-that-tribes-have-no-immunity-in-telecommunications-case/; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Okla. SCT
Grants Cert to Decide Tribal Immunity Case, TURTLE TALK (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:02 AM),
Seneca
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/01/13/okla-sct-grants-cert-to-decide-tribal-immunity-case/;
Telephone Company v Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.standupca.org/court-rulings/federal/seneca%20telephone.pdf/view; Supreme Court Casesfrom the
2011-2012 Term Impacting Native Americans, NATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY (last updated Jan 22, 2012),
http://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/sct/currentsct.html; In the Courts, ARENT Fox (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://www.arentfox.com/publications/index.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&content-id=3078.
These cited discussions suggest that tribes and tribal entities greatly feared an affirmation of the trial
court's decision, especially by this nation's highest court. It is my position, as highlighted in this note, that this
fear is warranted for only a small majority of tribal entities. As this note highlights, tribal sovereign immunity
harms more than it protects. Some protected by this doctrine are analogous to what some call "Big Business"
and others are tribal governments and tribal politicians. The assertion that this doctrine protects rights of selfgovernment is at times mere pretext for the fact that some receiving protection are corrupt tribal government
officials, corrupt tribal courts, and corrupt tribal executive branches - and the lines between these powers are
oft blurred, or fail to exist.
Please note that I am not making a sweeping generalization of all tribal governments, tribal leaders,
and/or tribal members. I am, in fact, a proud member of the Muscogee Creek Nation. I also believe that the
majority of tribal governments are no more corrupt than those of our municipalities, states, and nation. There
are, however, a rogue few using the shield of tribal sovereign immunity as a sword. Furthermore, as this note
later elucidates, this doctrine is a threat to each of us. Whether affecting us directly as victims in tort or
indirectly as members of a sluggish economy, the issue deserves an honest examination absent our individual
biases and perspectives - an examination our nation's highest court is not yet willing to make.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court of Ottawa County,
Oklahoma by a unanimous 3-0 decision. Seneca Telephone Company v. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, No.
107,431 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). Miami Tribe appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court resulting in a reversal
without remand in a 7-2 decision. Seneca Telephone Company v. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma. 253 P.3d 53
(Okla. 2011).
The issue in Seneca was nuanced rather than broadly balancing on a tribe's immunity from suit. The
issue narrowly asks: What is the scope of tribal sovereign immunity in light of a regulatory preemption
analysis? The Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to address this regulatory preemption analysis. It is purely
speculative whether the Oklahoma justices collectively overlooked or ignored the analysis. Perhaps they were
not persuaded. We are not, however, blessed with the same opportunity to ponder the United States Supreme
Court's position on the issue at this time.
1. Erik S. Laakkonen, Up in Smoke? Narragansett,Hicks, and the Erosion of Tribal Sovereign Immunity,
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Under this doctrine, the King is immune from suit because "the [K]ing can do no
wrong." 2 This concept still survives today, though abrogated to some degree by the
federal government and most state and local governments, in the form of tribal sovereign
immunity. Similar to the original concept, tribal sovereign immunity is a privilege
4
conferred upon federally recognized tribal nations as a result of their sovereign status.
This doctrine's history is as old as our nation and results from the effort to create a
"protectorate relationship" between the United States and the independent tribal nations,
wherein the United States is the dominant sovereign. 5 Tribal sovereignty grants tribal
nations the right to govern their own members within tribal lands with the consent of the
United States.6 Felix Cohen7 suggested that the powers of a federally recognized Indian
tribe are not delegated powers from "Congress, but rather "inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished." However, Congress is the sole entity
entrusted with the limitations of such tribal authority.9
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Actio ("IRA") authorizing
formation of tribal governments under federal law.Il This marked Congress's first
12
attempt to incorporate the tribes as political entities within the United States. The
13
purpose of the IRA was to enhance the tribes' ability to self govern and participate in
the commercial world. 14 However, this dichotomy between a dominant sovereign, the
United States, and the lesser sovereign, the tribal governments, created much conflict and
confusion in the realm of federal Indian Law.15
The doctrine of sovereign immunity not only created conflict and confusion within
our legal system, but also frustrated the spirit of American justicel6 and impeded the
progress and efficiency of the American business structure. 17 The court in FederalSugar
Refining Company v. Sugar EqualizationBoard expressed its concern that the doctrine

11 J. Gender Race & Just. 453, 472 (2008).
2. Id. at 472.
3. Id. at 470.
4. Id. at 471.
5. Bittle v. Bahe, 193 P.3d 810, 816 (Okla. 2008).
6. Id.
7. Felix Cohen is the one of the "central figures in the development of federal Indian law." His Handbook
of Federal Indian Law blazed the trail for Indian Law in federal courts during the 20th Century. Kevin K.
Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism andAmericanIndian Law, 33 Am. Indian L. Rev. 583, 584.
8. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (Five Rings Corp. 1986).
Center,
Sovereign
Immunity,
American
Indian
Policy
9. Mark
Anderson,
http://www.airpi.org/projects/sovimmun.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2005).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
11. Peter d'Errico, Sovereignty: A Brief History in the Context of U.S. "Indian law," UNIV. OF MASS.
LEGAL STUDIES DEP'T, http://www.umass.edullegal/derrico/sovereignty.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
12. Ann K. Wooster, Application of the Indian Reformation Act, 30 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2008).
13. d'Errico,supranote I1.
14. Bittle v. Bahe, 193 P.3d 810, 816 (Okla. 2008).
15. d'Errico,supra note 11.
16. Cook v. Avi Casino Enter., 548 F.3d 718, 720-726 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff lost his leg after the
defendant's employee hit him with a car while intoxicated. The plaintiff incurred over $1,000,000 in medical
expenses but could not recover from the tribe, because tribal sovereign immunity shielded the tribe from suit.
17. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998); Fed. Sugar Ref. Co. v. U.S. Sugar
Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
18. Fed.SugarRef Co., 268 F. 575.
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of tribal sovereign immunity was unjust. 19 The doctrine privileged tribes and tribal
corporations with the right to sue, yet granted immunity to those entities. 20 The United
States Supreme Court in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc.21 suggested that sovereign immunity "[could] harm those who [were] unaware that
they [were] dealing with a tribe, who [didi not know of tribal immunity, or who [had] no
choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims."22 Despite the Court's recognition of
the inherent harm resulting from tribal sovereign immunity, the Court, out of respect for
the Constitutional doctrine of Separation of Powers, 2 3 deferred to Congress to decide the
25
issue of narrowing the scope of tribal sovereign immunity.24 This trend continues.
Such problems with tribal sovereign immunity are exemplified in the recent case of
Seneca Telephone Company v. Miami Tribe of Oklahoma26 ("Seneca"). The parties in
Seneca tried the case before the small claims court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma. 27
However, the implications and magnitude of the ruling may prove to be much larger than
any other case tried in a small claims court in the country.28 In Seneca, the plaintiff,
Seneca Telephone Company, prevailed in a lawsuit against the defendant, Miami Tribe,
alleging negligent destruction of the plaintiffs telephone lines.29 Seneca's import lies in
the fact that not only did the court deny the defendant's motion to dismiss based on tribal
immunity, 30 but more significantly, that the plaintiff also received a favorable verdict for
its tort claims against the tribe and the tribal corporation, White Loon Construction
Company. 3 1
Seneca is currently unpublished and holds no precedential value, 32 but the
defendant, Miami Tribe, appealed the decision. 33 An affirmation of the trial court's
decision by an appellate court will open the floodgates of litigation against tribal entities
and force tribal corporations to re-examine their policies and behavior pertaining to their

19. Id. at 587.
20. Id.
21. Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751.
22. Id. at 758.
23. The Constitution prohibits the three branches of government from interfering with the others' specific
constitutional duties. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 215 (2009).
24. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760.
25. Cook v. Avi Casino Enter., 548 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J., concurring). Recognizing that
tribal sovereign immunity caused severe injustice to the plaintiff, Justice Gould stated his desire that the United
States Congress or Supreme Court limit sovereign immunity in the commercial context. See also Okla. Tax
Comm'n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991) ("Congress has
consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine.").
26. Journal Entry J., Seneca Tel. Co. v. Miami Tribe of Okla., Nos. SC-08-530, SC-09-531, SC-09-532,
SC-09-160 (D.C. Ottawa County July 20, 2009) [hereinafter Seneca].
27. Id.
28. Small claims court decisions contain "no more than obiter dictum." Patterson v. Beall, 19 P.3d 839, 848
(Okla. 2000). Obiter dictum is judicial comment that is "unnecessary to the decision in the case." Accordingly,
obiter dictum holds no precedential value. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2004). Therefore, the
small claims opinion in Seneca does not currently hold any precedential value. An affirmation of Seneca by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court or the Court of Civil Appeals will make the decision of the small claims court
controlling law, which could allow non-Indians to bring suit against Indian tribes.
29. Seneca, Journal Entry J. at 1.
30. Seneca, Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Mar. 3, 2009).
31. Seneca, Amended Journal Entry J. (Aug. 11, 2009).
32. Patterson, 19 P.3d at 848 (2000).
33. Seneca, Pet. in Error (Aug. 17, 2009).
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participation in the private market as proprietary organizations. 34 Consequently, the
appellate decision may drastically alter the relationship between the sovereign United
States and sovereign tribes. Despite the fact that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
allows tribes to injure citizens and businesses with impunity, 35 Congress refuses to
modify sovereign immunity to comport with modem business practices. 36 Therefore, the
Seneca appellate court should affirm the ruling of the trial court and narrow the scope of
tribal sovereign immunity when tribes act in a proprietary capacity in order to prevent
further injustice.
This case note summarizes a brief history of United States Indian policy, discusses
the current state of the law regarding tribal sovereign immunity, and urges the appellate
court to abrogate the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Section II of this case note
highlights the origin, purpose, and effects of tribal sovereign immunity. Section III
details the events leading up to the filing of the complaint in Seneca and discusses the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial, and the legal theories argued by both sides.
Section IV offers arguments and analysis as to why courts, in the interest of justice,
should no longer defer to Congress when deciding whether to abrogate the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity. This section discusses the Kiowa3 7 and Potawatomi38
decisions and highlights the American Indian Policy Institute's recognition that tribal
sovereign immunity may in fact harm tribal entities and citizens. 39 Based on the
American Indian Policy Institute's assertion, section IV makes an economic and public
policy argument in favor of abrogating tribal sovereign immunity and urges the appellate
court to affirm the decision of the trial court in Seneca and narrow the scope of TSI as
necessary in light of a regulatory preemption analysis. Additionally, this section also
suggests that tribal nations model Oklahoma's abrogation of state sovereign immunity
when the state acts in a proprietary capacity. 4 0 Finally, Section V concludes the case note
and offers tribal nations, Congress, and the courts possible approaches to resolving the
current state of tribal sovereign immunity in the modem commercial age. Section V also

34. In Seneca, the defendant, a tribal corporation, filed a motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign
immunity, but the trial court allowed the case to proceed, and the plaintiff was successful. Seneca, supra note
26, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (Dec. 23, 2008); Seneca, supra note 26, Order with Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 4 (Mar. 3, 2009). As discussed earlier, Seneca does not have precedential value and,
consequently, does not change Oklahoma law with regard to tribal sovereign immunity. Patterson, 19 P.3d at
848. Accordingly, if an appellate court affirms the decision in Seneca, tribal corporations would no longer be
protected by sovereign immunity.
35. See generally Cook v. Avi Casino Enter., 548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2008). In Cook, an employee of the
defendant hit the plaintiff with her car while he was on his motorcycle. Id. at 720. The employee was
intoxicated after defendant's employees over served alcohol to her at the defendant's place of business. Id. The
plaintiff lost his leg in the accident and incurred over $1,000,000 in medical expenses, but the Court held that
Avi Casino Enterprises, a tribal corporation, was immune from suit. Id. at 721, 726. Thus, the plaintiff had no
redress for his injuries. In Kiowa, the tribe signed a promissory note for $285,000 plus interest and defaulted on
the note. 523 U.S. 751. The United States Supreme Court held that tribes are immune from civil suits on
contracts whether made on or off the reservation. Id. at 751. Again, sovereign immunity deprived the plaintiff
of redress for its injuries.
36. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759.
37. Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751.
38. Potawatomi,498 U.S. at 509.
39. Anderson, supranote 9.
40. Howard K. Berry, Jr., The Dragon of Sovereign Immunity -A Delay of the Slaying?, 50 Okla. B.J. 884,
885 (1979).
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sets forth a test courts should apply when deciding whether a tribe is immune from suit.
II.

THE ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND EFFECTS OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The relationship between tribal nations and the United States is complex, 4 1
resulting from the covenant relationship between two sovereigns as set forth in the
United States Constitution.42 When Europeans first arrived in what is now the United
States, approximately 500 tribal nations existed in the newly discovered territory. 43 Most
of the tribes openly welcomed the Europeans into their territories by assisting the
newcomers with the challenges of colonial living and trading.4 Between 1700 and 1750,
the population of the British colonies increased by 400 percent, thus shifting the balance
of power from the Indians to the colonists. 45 The American victory over the British in
the American Revolution 46 marked the beginning of the tribal nations' struggle to
maintain autonomy and sovereignty within the United States 4 7 because "[t]he new
nation, born of a bloody revolution and committed to expansion, could not tolerate
America as Indian country." 4 8
When Christopher Columbus first arrived in North America, there were
approximately one million Indians living in the Americas. 4 9 By the year 1900, the
American Indian population declined to 300,000,50 though the number of American
Indians rebounded to 3.2 million as of 2006, as indicated by the United States Center for
Disease Control. 5 1 Indian communities historically face many social and economic
.
barriers. 52 Those prevalent barriers continue even today. 53 A majority
of such problems
54
are fairly attributable to geographical inconvenience. Most Indian reservations are not
located near large industrial centers, and most reservation land is void of valuable natural
resources. 55 As a result, most tribes still rely on the assistance of the United States
government for economic support. 56

41. JEDON A. EMENHISER, A PECULIAR COVENANT: AMERICAN INDIAN PEOPLES AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AMERICAN INDIANS AND U.S. POLITICS: A COMPANION READER 3 (John M. Meyer ed. 2002).

42. Id.
43. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES I (3d ed. 2002).
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. The American Revolution was the fight for independence from the British lasting from 1775 to 1783.
JAMES H. O'DONNELL, III, SOUTHERN INDIANS INTHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION x (1973).
47. Pevar, supra note 43, at 2.
48. Id. (quoting COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION ININDIAN COUNTRY xv (1995)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Health of American Indian or Alaska Native
Population,http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/indfacts.htm (last reviewed Mar. 6, 2009).
52. Indian tribes still struggle with poverty, disease, alcoholism, violence, and unemployment. Yvette
Roubideaux, M.D., Beyond Red Lake - The PersistentCrisis in American Indian Health Care, 353 N. Engl. J.
Med. 1881-1882 (2005).
53. Pevar, supra note 43, at 3.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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History of United States Indian Policy Since the French and Indian War

The long and complex relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes
largely resulted from wars fought between the several countries laying claim to the New
World. 57 The British victory in the French and Indian War, 5 8 or the Seven Years War, is
often attributed to the successful alliance between the British Army and the Iroquois
Confederacy against the French. 59 As a result of the Iroquois' loyalty to the British, the
King of England issued a proclamation restricting further takings of Indian lands by the
colonists. 60 This proclamation, however, did little to discourage land disputes between
the British colonists and the Indians, and conflicts over land became increasingly
violent.61 Consequently, American patriots remained suspicious of the prior relationship
between the tribes and England during the Revolutionary War.62 The patriots' suspicion
prompted a strategy to move the war into Indian territory.63 The patriots believed this
strategy would discourage the tribes from forming another alliance with the British.6
This strategy ultimately led to the destruction of Indian villages and crops.65 Many
tribes, although neutral, were nevertheless nearly decimated.66 After American victory in
the Revolutionary War, the newly formed government was anxious to create peace with
tribal nations.6 7 Years of war with the British weakened the U.S. economy and military,
leaving the United States with minimal resources to support further wars with the tribal
nations. 68 Immediate peace was necessary to secure the future success of the nation. 69 In
its peace efforts with tribal nations, the United States government adopted a new stance
with regard to tribal nations, elevating the nations to a stature equal to that of foreign
nations. 70
Between 1787 and 1793, Congress passed a series of laws designed to protect
tribal land and sovereignty. 71 The laws prohibited whites from the following: 1) taking
tribal property without tribal consent; 2) obtaining land from tribal nations without
complying with federal guidelines; and 3) settling on Indian lands.72 Additionally,

57. Id. at 5.
58. The British prevailed in the French Indian War. Pevar, supra note 43, at 5.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 gave Indian groups the land between the Appalachia Mountains
and the Mississippi River. This land spanned from the Hudson Bay watershed in the North to western Florida
in the South. The proclamation restricted land purchases and trading in the new Indian territory and required
settlers to withdraw from this region. Thomas Kindig, Related Information: Resources to help better
understand the context of the Declaration of Independence, Proclamation of 1763,
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/proc63.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
61. Pevar, supranote 43, at 5.
62. The American Revolution was the fight for independence from the British lasting from 1775 to 1783.
O'DONNELL, supra note 46, at x; Pevar, supranote 43, at 5.
63. Pevar, supranote 43, at 5.
64. Id.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Pevar, supra note 43, at 6.
68. Id
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Id
72. Pevar, supra note 43, at 6.
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Congress passed laws authorizing the prosecution of whites for crimes committed against
Indians. 73 None of these laws had the purpose or effect of limiting tribal sovereignty.74
Federal officials, however, rarely enforced these laws and actual United States Indian
policy was usually at odds with official policy. 75 American settlers flooded Indian
76
country as federal officials turned a blind eye to this incursion. However, United States
Indian policy achieved harmony under Andrew Jackson's administration in 1828. 7 This
new Indian policy removed eastern tribes to the West 78 via Congress's passage of the
80
Indian Removal Act of 1830. This relocation, now known as the Trail of Tears,
marked the beginning of reservation life for most Indian tribes.81 Ironically, two years
after the passage of the Indian Relocation Act, the Supreme Court issued a decision in
Worcester v. Georgia,82 holding that tribal nations were autonomous entities.83 Chief
Justice John Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court:
From the commencement of our government, Congress has passed acts to regulate trade
and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and a
firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts ... consider
the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
84
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
This recognition of tribal sovereignty provided the necessary foundation for its
"corollary," sovereign immunity. 85 Despite Chief Justice Marshall emphasizing the
necessity of enforcing treaties with tribal nations, Congress terminated treaty formations
with Indian tribes in 1871 leaving the relationship between the United States and the
tribal nations to the discretion of Congress's legislative power and the President's
executive power. 86
Between 1887 and 1934, the two main objectives of United States Indian policy
were claiming more Indian lands for white settlement and assimilating the Indians into
American culture. Many non-Indians sympathetic to the plight of native peoples shared
the latter stance, as they believed that assimilation was the best means to overcome tribal
poverty. Congress collectively supported both of these objectives. 89 In 1887, Congress

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. Pevar,supra note 43, at 7.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. AMY H. STURGIs, THE TRAIL OF TEARS AND INDIAN REMOVAL 2 (2007).
81. Pevar, supra note 43, at 7.
82. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
83. Id. at 557-558.
84. Id. at 557.
85. See Laakkonen, supra note 1, at 470-471. See also Bittle, 192 P.3d at 819 ("It is the sovereignty that
gives rise to the immunity from private suit in order to protect the dignity of the sovereign.").
86. Emenhiser, supra note 41, at 7.
87. Pevar, supra note 43, at 7.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id.
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passed the Dawes Act 9 0 which eliminated tribal sovereignty and expedited Indian
assimilation.91 As a result, more lands were freed for white settlement and tribes were
driven further into poverty. 92
These policies were in effect until 1934 when the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration, in response to public criticism of U.S. Indian policy, urged Congress's
passage of the IRA, also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act.93 The purpose of the IRA 94
was to facilitate an economic revival for tribal nations by implementing the following
policies: prohibiting any further allotments of tribal land to non-Indians; granting
authority to the Secretary of the Interior to create new land and add land to existing
reservations for tribes that no longer had tribal land; and encouraging tribes to adopt their
own constitutions and become chartered corporations under federal law. 95 Despite its
criticisms,96 the IRA succeeded in revitalizing both tribal governments and the
opportunities of tribal people. 97 The IRA provided improvements to reservation
infrastructure, education, housing, and health services.98 However, under the Hoover
administration in 1949, the pendulum of American Indian policy made a backswing in
favor of Indian assimilation. 99
Hoover's new policy, called termination, "terminat[ed] the tribe's trust relationship
with the United States and, as a consequence, its loss of federal benefits and support
services and the destruction of its government and reservation."1 00 This termination
policy led to the passage of laws in several states, wherein these states regained
jurisdiction over Indian trust lands.10 1 Then in 1968, the American Indian policy
pendulum swung back toward an attitude of benevolence and support for tribal
sovereignty.102 This phase of policy, known as "Tribal Self-Determination,',103 was first
declared by Lyndon B. Johnson when he stated, "[w]e must affirm the rights of the first
Americans to remain Indians while exercising their rights as Americans. We must affirm
their rights to freedom of choice and self-determination." 1 04 The doctrine of Tribal SelfDetermination was also endorsed by conservative administrations such as Nixon and
Reagan, and continues today. 105 Programs enacted under this doctrine included the

90. 25 U.S.C. § 349.
91. Pevar, supra note 43, at 8.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 9-10.

94. 25 U.S.C. § 461.
95. Pevar, supra note 43, at 9-10.
96. The Act was criticized for being paternalistic, because it was passed without consultation with or assent
of the tribes. It was also criticized, because the tribes were still under federal control. Id. at 10.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Pevar, supra note 43, at 11.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 12.
103. Id.
104. Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement on Issuing Exec. Or. 11399, 4 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 448 (Mar. 5,
1968).
105. Pevar, supra note 43, at 12.
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passage of the Indian Mineral Development Act,106 the allocation of funds to stimulate
10 7
Indian businesses, and the passage of education bills and child welfare programs.
Although current Indian policy recognizes that tribal sovereignty and its corollary, tribal
sovereign immunity, is well-rooted in American common law, the Supreme Court noted
in 1978 that such rights conferred to the tribes by Congress can terminate at any moment
under Congress's plenary authority. 10 8 Additionally, the Court has long recognized that
09
tribal sovereign immunity is a source of injustice within our legal system.1
B.

Examples ofInjustice Resultingfrom Tribal Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity precludes plaintiffs with meritorious
claims against tribes or tribal entities from seeking redress for their injuries.Ilo In Kiowa
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies., Inc.,111 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Kiowa tribe was immune from suit to enforce the tribe's default of a
$285,000 promissory note.112 The Court's decision deprived the plaintiff, Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc. ("Manufacturing Technologies"), of any remedy to recover the
proceeds of the defaulted note. 113 The defendant, Kiowa Tribe ("Tribe"), was a federally
recognized Indian tribe owning trust lands in Oklahoma.114 In 1990, the Kiowa
Industrial Development Commission, a tribal entity, agreed to purchase stock issued by
Clinton-Sherman Aviation Company. 1 15 The Tribe signed a promissory note in the name
of the Tribe in order to pay for the stock. 1 16 The chairman of the Tribe's business
committee signed the note on tribal land, promising payment to the plaintiff of $285,000
plus interest in exchange for the stock. 117 However, the Tribe actually executed and
delivered the note to the plaintiff in Oklahoma City, outside the borders of their tribal
land.118 Furthermore, the language of the note obligated the Tribe to make payments in
Oklahoma City. 119 The Tribe defaulted on the note, and Manufacturing Technologies
initiated suit against the Tribe for non-payment. 120 The Tribe filed a motion to dismiss
106. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2102 (West 2009). The Indian Mineral Development Act allows tribes to partner with
private mineral companies in order to fully exploit the natural resources within tribal lands. Pevar, supra note
43, at 12-13.
107. Pevar, supra note 43, at 12-13.
108. "The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their
existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependant status." United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978).
109. Fed. Sugar Ref. Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
110. See generally Cook v. Avi Casino Enter., 548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2008); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg.
Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991).
111. Kiowa, 523 U.S.751.
112. Id. at 751.
113. Id. at 753.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 753.
117. Id. at 753-754.
118. Id. at 754.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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asserting the sovereign immunity defense.121 The trial court denied the Tribe's motion
and rendered a verdict in favor of Manufacturing Technologies. 122
The Tribe appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appealsl23 which affirmed the
trial court's decision, holding that Indian tribes were not immune from suit in state court
for "breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct."l24 The
Oklahoma Court of Appeals relied on Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahomal25 in its
decision. 12 6 In Hoover, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the State may allow
citizens to sue other sovereigns acting within the State, because the State held itself open
to breach of contract suits. 127 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after
the Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to review the case.128
The Court, adhering to prior Oklahoma court precedent, refused to distinguish
tribal activities occurring on reservation land from tribal activities occurring off
reservation land.129 Furthermore, the Court asserted the Tribe was immune from suit
unless the Tribe waived its immunity or Congress authorized suit. 130 Manufacturing
Technologies argued that immunity from suit only applied to transactions occurring on
reservations.
The Court disagreed, stating that precedent required that tribes possessed
immunity from suit, regardless of whether the tribe acted in a governmental or
proprietary capacity and no matter where the disputed action physically occurred.132 The
Court declined to follow the Oklahoma Supreme Court's reasoning in Hoover.133
According to the Court, federal law controlled tribal immunity, and states lacked the
power to abrogate the doctrine. 134 The Court recognized, however, that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was a product of errant case law, but notwithstanding this error the
Court upheld prior precedent.135 Despite the Court's recognition of the need to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity, 136 the Court deferred to Congress's plenary power to define
the rights of tribal sovereign nations. 137 Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, leaving Manufacturing Technologies with no recourse
for its $285,000 injury. 138
The United States Supreme Court also held that tribes did not waive tribal
121. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 909 P.2d 59 (Okla. 1995).
126. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 754.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755.
132. Id. at 754-55.
133. Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 909 P.2d 59 (Okla. 1995).
134. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756.
135. Id. at 756-57. The discussion of the Court's recognition that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty developed
by accident is discussed later in this case note.
136. Id. at 758. Again, this case note discusses judicial recognition of tribal immunity's harm in a later
section.
137. Id. at 759.
138. Id. at 760.
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139
In Oklahoma Tax
sovereign immunity when initiating suit against another party.
140
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Potawatomi
14 1
The
Tribe ("Potawatomi") sold cigarettes from a convenience store on tribal land.
Oklahoma Tax Commission ("Commission") sent the tribe a letter demanding payment
for $2.7 million in back taxes for previous cigarette sales.142 Potawatomi filed suit
against the Commission to enjoin the tax assessment. 14 3 The Commission
counterclaimed seeking enforcement of the tax assessment and enjoining the tribe from
future cigarette sales without paying state tobacco taxes. 144 Potawatomi filed a motion to
dismiss the Commission's claims, arguing that Potawatomi did not waive its immunity
from suit when it filed suit against the Commission. 145 The trial court denied the Tribe's
motion, yet held on the merits that the Commission did not have the authority to tax the
Tribe's on-reservation cigarette sales. 14 6 The Tribe then appealed the trial court's denial
147
of the motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, stating that Potawatomi "enjoy[ed] absolute sovereign
immunity from suit, and had not waived that immunity by filing an action for injunctive
relief."1 48
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision, holding
that a party could not circumvent tribal sovereign immunity by filing a cross-claim
against the Tribe because the Tribe was immune from all suits whether brought as an
original action or as a counterclaim. 149 As a result, the State of Oklahoma could not
150
In his concurring
enforce the collection of tobacco taxes through the court system.
opinion, Justice Stevens conceded that tribal immunity from suit was "an established part
of our law."1 5 1 However, Justice Stevens also recognized the fundamental unfairness of
this doctrine when he stated that "all Governments - federal, state, and tribal - should
generally be accountable for their illegal conduct." 1 52 This was not the first time the
federal judiciary expressed its disdain for the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. 153
This frustration was eloquently stated over seventy years earlier in Federal Sugar
Refining Company v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Board1 54 when the court stated "[i]t is
repugnant to the American theory of sovereignty that an instrumentality of the sovereign
shall have all the rights and advantages of a trading corporation, and the ability to sue,

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505.
Id.
Id. at 505, 507.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Potawatomi,498 U.S. at 505, 507-508.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 509-10.
Potawatomi,498 U.S. at 514.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Fed. Sugar Ref. Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
Id.
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and yet itself be immune from suit. . . .',155
A case out of California, Cook v. Avi Casino Enterprises,156 demonstrated a
particularly tragic example of how tribal sovereign immunity resulted in severe injustice.
In Cook,157 employees of Avi Casinol58 hosted a birthday party at the casino for another
employee. 159 During the party, the on-duty manager announced that drinks were "on the
house." 1 60 The manager continued to serve Andrea Christensen, an off-duty employee of
the casino, alcoholic drinks after she was already noticeably intoxicated.161 Later that
night, the manager and another casino employee helped Christensen board a casino-run
shuttle bus that took her to her car.162 Once in her vehicle, she swerved across the
median and hit Cook on his motorcycle.163 Cook lost his leg in the collision and incurred
over $1,000,000 in medical expenses.164 Christensen served four years in prison for
aggravated assault and driving under the influence.165 Cook initiated a negligence and
dram shop liability action against Avi Casino Enterprises and against the two casino
employees who served Christensen drinks and helped her to her car.166
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were immune from suit
under the Tribe's sovereign immunity.167 The trial court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss, finding that Avi Casino Enterprises was an arm of the Tribe, and tribal
sovereign immunity extended to tribal corporations.168 Further, tribal sovereign
immunity also extended to tribal corporation employees.169 The trial court dismissed Avi
Casino Enterprises and the two employee defendants from the suit.170 Cook appealed the
trial court's dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the court affirmed the
trial court's decision.171
The Court of Appeals, relying on Kiowa, 172 asserted that a tribe was immune from
suit regardless of whether the tribe acted in a governmental or commercial capacity.173
Cook conceded that the Tribe was immune from suit but argued that Avi Casino
Enterprises, a tribal corporation, did not enjoy such immunity. 174 Cook compellingly
asserted that "tribal corporations competing in the economic mainstream should not

155. Id. at 587.
156. Cook v. Avi Casino Enter., 548 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2008).
157. Id.
158. Avi Casino was operated by Avi Casino Enterprises, Inc. Avi Casino Enterprises is a tribal corporation
organized under the laws of the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, a federally recognized tribe. Id. at 721.
159. Id. at 720.
160. Id. at 721.
161. Cook, 548 F.3d at 721.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Cook, 548 F.3d at 720.
167. Id. at 722.
168. Id. at 721.
169. Id. at 722.
170. Id.
171. Cook, 548 F.3d at 722.
172. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
173. Cook, 548 F.3d at 725.
174. Id. at 725.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss3/6

12

Harp: One Nation - Reexamining Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Modern
2011

ONE NATION?

461

enjoy the same immunity from suit given to Indian tribes themselves." 1 75 Additionally,
granting tribal corporations immunity from suit was unnecessary in protecting tribal
176
sovereignty and autonomy, which was the purpose of tribal sovereign immunity.
The Court of Appeals recognized that the Supreme Court "grudgingly accepted
tribal immunity in the commercial context" in Kiowa, 177 but further stated that
"restrictions on tribal immunity [were] for Congress alone to impose." 1 78 The Court of
Appeals further held that "[t]ribal sovereign immunity 'extend[ed] to tribal officials
"179
when acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority.'
Because Cook pled in his complaint that the two casino employees acted "within the
course and scope of their authority as casino employees," the Court of Appeals held that
the employees were also immune from suit. 180 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
trial court's decision.181 Consequently, Avi Casino Enterprises and its employees
escaped liability for their negligence. 182
Tribal sovereignty and its corollary, tribal sovereign immunity, are not only
18 3
harmful to non-Indians but are also detrimental to the well-being of tribal members.
184
made the
In his report to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Roland Morris, Sr.
reservations
bold statement that "basic human rights . . . [were] not guaranteed on Indian
under the present version of 'sovereignty.' ',185 He stated that many tribal governments
were corrupt and that "[c]ronyism, nepotism and ballot box rigging [were] all part of
political reality on many reservations."l86 Morris further stated that tribal governments
often "ke[pt] their people in the bondage of poverty and oppression," and tribal members
had no recourse for injustices occurring as a result of tribal corruption. 18 7 There was no
separation of powers within tribal governments, allowing such governments to commit
civil rights violations against their own people.188 Tribal sovereign immunity prevented
tribal members from bringing civil rights actions against their tribes in any venue other
than tribal court,189 thus perpetuating tribal government corruption and oppression.190
Morris also suggested that tribal economies would improve and attract more businesses

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
178. Cook, 548 F.3d at 725.
179. Id. at 727 (quoting Linneen v. Gila River Indian Comm., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See generally Cook, 548 F.3d 718.
183. Roland Morris, Sr., Testimony before the S. Committee on Indian Affairs Regarding S. 1691; Tribal
Sovereign
Immunity,
Testimony
of
Mr.
Roland
Morris,
Sr.,
http://www.accessmontana.com/morris/pagel9.html#Morris (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
184. Roland Morris, Sr. is a board member of the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance and president of All
Citizens Equal. He is also a full-blood Anishinabe Indian. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Morris, supranote 183.
189. Tribal courts are often corrupt. William J. Lawrence, J.D., Testimony before the S. Committee on Indian
Act,"
Justice
Equal
Indian
American
1691
"The
S.
Concerning
Affairs
http://www.citizensalliance.org/links/pages/news/Testimony_S_1691.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
190. Morris, supra note 183.
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to reservations if tribal governments were held accountable for injustices committed
upon their own citizens. 19 1
The American Indian Policy Center ("AIPC") also recognized that tribal sovereign
immunity negatively affected tribal economies.192 AIPC conceded that businesses were
hesitant to conduct business with tribal corporations "because of the inherent risk."1 93
These inherent risks were the lack of recourse for non-Indian businesses in the event that
the tribal corporation breached a contract or committed a tort against the business. 194
In the same Senate Committee hearing, William J. Lawrence 1 9 5 offered further
testimony explaining how tribal sovereign immunity enabled oppression of tribal
members by tribal governments. 196 Lawrence stated that most tribal governments were
void of the crucial checks and balances present in the American system that ensure a
stable and just Democracy.197 Furthermore, tribal elections were rarely free and fair.198
Tribal courts were not impartial, and consequently, provided little protection of the
"basic liberties of speech, assembly, press, and property." 1 9 9 According to Lawrence,
tribal governments were cyclical, and while one tribal government acted benevolently to
its constituency, the next regime possibly ignored or reversed the protections offered by
the previous government enabled by the sovereign immunity defense. 20 0 Lawrence
suggested that these problems persisted so long as tribal citizens were forced to pursue
redress for harms caused by their government in corrupt tribal courts instead of impartial
state or federal courts.201 The absence of adequate access to impartial courts "[gave]
Indian people less rights and more poverty, discord, government corruption and abuse of
power."202 Lawrence concluded his testimony with the assertion that tribal sovereign
immunity "protect[s] a culture of corruption, oppression, and unaccountability" within
tribal governments. 20 3
III.

SENECA TELEPHONE COMPANY V.

MIAMI TRIBE

OF OKLAHOMA

The plaintiff, Seneca Telephone Company ("STC"), provided telephone service to
more than 3,300 access lines in a 135 square mile territory encompassing northeast
Oklahoma.204 The Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma ("Shawnees") was one of STC's
largest customers. 20 5 STC provided telephone service to a travel plaza, a social services

19 1. Id.
192. Anderson, supra note 9.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Lawrence is an attorney with thirty years of experience in Indian affairs at the tribal, state, federal, and
private levels, and he owns and publishes a weekly newspaper titled Native American Press/ Ojibwe News. He
is also a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians located in Minnesota. Lawrence, supra note 189.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Lawrence, supra note 189.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
205. Id.
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center, and a housing subdivision all owned by Shawnees in Ottawa County,
Oklahoma.206 The defendant, Miami Tribe, was a federally-recognized Indian tribe, and
White Loon Construction Company ("White Loon") was an excavation company owned
and operated by the Miami Tribe. 20 7 In 2007 and 2008, the Shawnees hired White Loon
to perform excavation on Shawnees' land in Ottawa County. 208 On December 4, 2007,
while White Loon excavated on Shawnees' property, they severed one of STC's
telephone lines.209 The resulting damage totaled $5,152.00.210 Less than one year later
on August 4, 2008, White Loon again severed one of STC's telephone lines, resulting in
damages of $4,237.55.211 Merely one week later, White Loon severed a third STC
telephone line, causing $1,497.90 in damage.212 This was the third time in less than a
year that White Loon managed to destroy STC's telephone equipment.213 On November
3, 2008, STC filed three affidavits with the Ottawa County Small Claims Court claiming
that White Loon negligently and willfully damaged STC's telephone lines.214 While
these three claims were pending litigation, White Loon once again severed STC's,
appallingly at the exact same locations as the first two cuts, on February 3, 2009,
resulting in $3,351.48 in damage.215 STC then filed a fourth affidavit demanding
payment from White Loon.216 These four claims were consolidated into a single bench
trial, wherein STC sued White Loon for the negligent and willful destruction of its
telephone lines. 2 17
A.

White Loon's Motion to Dismiss

The most remarkable procedural aspect in Seneca is that the case survived the
defendant's motion to dismiss 2 18 based on White Loon's brandishing of the tribal
sovereign immunity sword.219 White Loon argued that they were immune from suit and
that Congress did not waive tribal sovereign immunity for suits brought against the tribe
for causes of action involving utilities on Indian land.220 White Loon relied on Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez221 and several federal cases222 to establish Miami Tribe's

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Seneca, Trial Tr. at 11:14-24.
210. Id.
211. Id.at 11:25,12:1-6.
212. Id at 12:7-15.
213. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.
214. Seneca, Aff. of Jay Mitchell at 1.
215. Seneca, Trial Tr. at 12:16-25.
216. Seneca, Aff. of Jay Mitchell at 1.
217. Seneca, Trial Tr. at 17:14-20.
218. Seneca, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.
219. Seneca, Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 126.
220. Seneca, Def.'s Reply Br. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 1-5.'
221. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
222. See, e.g., Duke v. Absentee Shawnee Tribe Housing Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that state-chartered housing authority of the tribe shared tribe's sovereign status for purposes of
federal employment law); Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000)
(tribally-chartered community college was an arm of the tribe and entitled to the "full extent of the Tribe's
sovereign immunity"); In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that wholly-owned enterprise of
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immunity from suit.223 The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo224 stated that "Indian tribes
have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."225 The Court further stated that there was no
such implied waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, and any waiver of immunity by a tribe
"must be unequivocally expressed." 226
White Loon, relying on federal case law, asserted that, as a tribal enterprise, they
were also immune from suit.227 White Loon's contention was that STC failed to prove
that White Loon waived its sovereign immunity or that Congress clearly abrogated tribal
sovereign immunity under the circumstances.228 According to White Loon, STC urged
the Court to "ignore clear and well-established federal law and take the unprecedented
step of first determining whether the cause of action 'affect[ed] tribal sovereignty' or
touche[d] on a 'tradition of tribal sovereign immunity' to determine if sovereign
immunity applie[d]." 2 29 In its conclusion, White Loon pointed to the lack of case law
supporting the plaintiffs proposition that courts must first determine whether a cause of
action affected tribal sovereignty when determining whether a tribe was open to suit. 2 30
STC's first argument in response to White Loon's motion to dismiss was that there
was no tradition of tribal sovereignty "in cases involving torts arising out of excavation
activities ....231 Relying on Bittle,23 2 STC asserted that tribal sovereign immunity only
applied when the cause of action affected tribal sovereignty. 233 STC argued that a
negligence claim arising from the commercial activity of excavation did not affect
Miami Tribe's sovereignty; therefore, tribal sovereign immunity did not apply to White
Loon. 234 Furthermore, tribal sovereign immunity was not a defense to suit in state court
when there was a "lack of tradition of tribal self-government in a particular area of law
or regulation" and that "[t]he Tribe's operation of an excavating company for profit in no
way affect[ed] tribal self-government or the Tribe's internal affairs."235 Accordingly,
White Loon was not immune from a suit in state court.236 STC asserted that White Loon

Yakima Tribe enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity from a suit by the bankruptcy trustee); Multimedia Games,
Inc. v. WLGC Acquisition Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1135 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (corporate and economic
entities established by the tribe to further governmental objectives possess attributes of tribal sovereignty);
Worrall v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 131 F.Supp.2d 328, 331 (D. Conn. 2001) (gaming enterprise
of a tribe entitled to same immunity that protects the tribe from unconsented suit)." Seneca, Def's Br. in Supp.
Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
223. Id.
224. 436 U.S. 49.
225. Id. at 58.
226. Id. at 58-59; accord Okla. Tax Comm'n. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991).
227. Seneca, Def.'s Reply Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss at 2.
228. Id. at 3.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
3.
232. Bittle v. Bahe, 193 P.3d 810, 817 (Okla. 2008)
233. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
4.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 5.
236. Id. at 5-6.
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incorrectly relied on Kiowa237 in its motion to dismiss because the decision in Kiowa238
was related to a breach of contract claim against a tribe and distinguishable from a
private tort action claim as seen in Seneca.239
STC's second argument involved a creative interpretation of federal and state
communications laws.240 Once again relying on Bittle,241 STC argued that if Congress
implicitly delegated authority to the states to regulate a particular area of law, state courts
had the right to exercise jurisdiction over tribes in order to enforce that particular area of
law.242 In deciding whether a state could exercise jurisdiction over a tribe or tribal
activity, the Bittle243 Court adopted a preemption analysis set forth in Rice v. Rehner.244
In Rice,245 the federal government issued a license to an Indian trader allowing him to
sell liquor.246 The Indian trader sought an exemption from California's state required
liquor license, arguing that the federal laws of tribal sovereign immunity and federal
liquor regulations preempted state law and deprived state courts of jurisdiction in that
area. 247 The statute 24 8 under which the Indian trader obtained his license required that all
liquor transactions occurring within Indian country comply with the laws of the state
encompassing the Indian territory. 24 9 Accordingly, the Rice 250 Court found that
Congress conferred state jurisdiction over tribes with respect to this particular area of law
- liquor licensing. 251 More importantly, the challenged statute did not expressly
authorize state jurisdiction over tribes for violating state liquor laws.252 Nonetheless, the
Court held that the statute abrogated tribal sovereign immunity with respect to liquor
laws. 253
The Bittle2 54 Court used Rice's 255 reasoning to develop the following preemption
analysis when determining state jurisdiction over tribes absent explicit Congressional
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity:
1) the goal of preemption analysis is to determine the congressional plan; 2) in preemption

237. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
238. Id.
239. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
6.
240. Id. at 9-12.
241. Bittle v. Bahe, 193 P.3d 810, 817 (Okla. 2008).
242. Seneca, PI.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
6-7.
243. Bittle, 192 P.3d at 823.
244. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
245. Rice, 463 U.S. 713.
246. Id. at 716.
247. Id.
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1161.
249. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
7.
250. Rice, 463 U.S. 713.
251. Seneca, PI.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
7 (discussing Rice, 463 U.S. at 723-725).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Bittle v. Babe, 193 P.3d 810, 817 (Okla. 2008).
255. Rice, 463 U.S. 713.
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analysis, the tradition of tribal sovereignty is a backdrop against which the federal statute
must be read; 3) tribal sovereignty, as a backdrop, informs the preemption analysis but does
not determine preemption; 4) in preemption analysis, the role of sovereign immunity with
the traditions that accommodate the interests of the tribe and the federal government on the
one hand and that state on the other; 5) if tradition has recognized a tribal sovereign
immunity in favor of the Indians, then state law will be preempted unless Congress
expressly provides otherwise; and 6) if there is no tradition of tribal sovereign immunity in
favor of the Indians, preemption analysis may accord less weight to the backdrop of tribal
sovereignty.

256

Using this analysis, the Bittle257 Court determined that federal law did not preempt
state jurisdiction over a tribe in the area of liquor law because of the following: 1) there
was no tradition of tribal sovereign immunity or tribal self-government in the area of
liquor regulation; 2) 18 U.S.C. § 1161258 authorized state jurisdiction over liquor
licensing; and 3) the state had a strong interest in regulating liquor transactions because
259
of its significant effect on the state's Indian and non-Indian citizens.
STC employed the reasoning in Bittle260 and Rice261 to conduct a preemption
262
STC noted that the
analysis with respect to state and federal communications law.
first step in the preemption analysis was considering Congress's plan relating to state and
federal regulation of utilities and telecommunications.263 Relying on federal statute 47
U.S.C. § 152(b)264 which mandates that the states, not the federal government, retained
sole jurisdiction over the regulation of intrastate communications services,265 STC
pointed the court's attention to Oklahoma's Underground Facilities Damage Prevention
Act. 26 6 That Act stated that excavators damaging underground facilities were required,
as a remedy to the owner of the facilities, to repair all damage to the facility. 267
STC addressed the second part of the Bittle268 analysis, which determined the
tradition of sovereign immunity as it related to telecommunications law. 269 STC relied

256. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
8 (quoting Bittle, 193 P.3d at 817) (emphasis added).
257. Bittle, 193 P.3d 810.
258. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 mandates that all liquor transactions in Indian country comply with the state law
encompassing tribal land.
259. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
8.
260. Bittle, 193 P.3d 810.
261. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
262. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def. 's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
9-12.
263. Id. at 9.
264. "[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission [FCC] jurisdiction
with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with
intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 152(b).
265. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
9.
266. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 142.1.
267. Seneca, Pl.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
9.
268. Bittle v. Bahe, 193 P.3d 810, 817 (Okla. 2008).
269. Seneca, PI.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at

10.
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on a South Dakota case, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Telephone Authority v. Public
Utilities Commission ofSouth Dakota270 in determining whether there existed a tradition
of tribal sovereign immunity in the field of telecommunications law. 27 1 In Cheyenne,272
the Public Utilities Commission of South Dakota ("PUC") prohibited the sale of
telephone exchanges from a Colorado phone company to a tribal telephone company in
South Dakota for use on Indian land. 273 The tribal corporation appealed PUC's decision
arguing that PUC did not have the authority to prevent the sale because such authority
infringed on the tribe's right to self-government, and only the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") had jurisdiction over telecommunications regulation.274 The court
275
noted that the tribal telephone company was governed by both the FCC and PUC.
However, relying on 47 U.S.C. § 152(b), the court held that the FCC did not have
jurisdiction over purely intrastate telecommunications facilities.276 The court also stated
that the PUC's authority furthered Congress's goal of protecting telecommunications
consumers through regulation.277 Accordingly, the court held that PUC had jurisdiction
over telecommunications on tribal land, and this authority was not preempted by federal
law.2 78
STC analogized the facts and reasoning in Cheyenne279 to the facts in Seneca. STC
proposed that Cheyenne's280 holding suggested that there was "no tradition of tribal selfgovernment as such relate[d] to regulating telecommunications on Indian land."281 Like
the telephone companies in Cheyenne, telephone companies in Oklahoma were subject to
the authority of both the FCC282 and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
("OCC"). 283 Accordingly, OCC's authority to regulate intrastate telecommunications
was not preempted by federal law, and White Loon was subject to the provisions of the
Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act284 requiring excavators to repair
damages to underground facilities. 2 85 Therefore, there was no tradition of tribal
sovereign immunity in the area of state telecommunications regulation, and White Loon
was obligated to compensate STC for damaging their telephone lines. 286
Finally, STC addressed the state of Oklahoma's interest in regulating intrastate

270.
271.
10.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
10-11.
282.
283.
284.
285.
10-11.
286.

595 N.W.2d 604 (S.D. 1999).
Seneca, PI's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
Cheyenne, 595 N.W.2d 604.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 609-610.
Id.
Cheyenne, 595 N.W.2d at 611.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Seneca, PI.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
47 U.S.C. § 151.
OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 18; OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 131.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 142.1.
Seneca, PL.'s Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
Id.
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telecommunications.287 According to Cheyenne, the purpose of dual federal and state
regulation of telecommunications was to protect telecommunications consumers from
service interruptions and unreasonably high rates. 28 8 STC asserted that White Loon
caused "telecommunication services to be disrupted when it negligently damaged
underground facilities . . . ."289 Further, the state had a strong interest in protecting its
telecommunications consumers, and this interest was protected under the passage of the
Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act.290 Under this act, the state would
require any other excavator, in same or similar circumstances, to pay for the damage to
STC's lines.291 Accordingly, White Loon should have been held to the same standard in
order to protect both consumers and providers of telecommunications services. 2 92 STC
concluded its argument by stating that the preemption analysis used in Rice 293 and
Bittle294 proved that: there wasno tradition of tribal sovereign immunity or tribal selfgovernment in telecommunications regulation; 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) authorized Oklahoma
jurisdiction over intrastate telecommunications; and that Oklahoma had an interest in
29 5
protecting its citizens, Indian and non-Indian, through telecommunications regulation.
Therefore, Miami Tribe and its subsidiary, White Loon, were not immune from suit.296
The court agreed with STC and denied White Loon's motion to dismiss. 297 The
court justified its decision on several premises, but the most convincing was the
preemption analysis set forth in Rice.298 Invoking the reasoning in Rice,299 the court
stated that Indians did not possess the inherent attributes of sovereignty within the field
of liquor regulation. 300 The court stated that this reasoning supported the proposition that
tribes also did not possess inherent sovereignty within the field of telecommunications
regulation. 30 1 Consequently, Oklahoma courts had proper jurisdiction over White
Loon.302 The court also listed the additional following reasons for denying White Loon's
Motion: STC had a constitutional right to due process to seek redress for its injury;
access to the courts was one of the most important privileges of citizenship; the
Oklahoma constitution delegated the power to regulate telecommunications utilities to
the OCC; and "the State of Oklahoma ha[d] dual if not exclusive jurisdiction over

287.
288.
289.
11.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
11-12.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at I1.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Tel. Auth. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of S.D., 595 N.W.2d at 611.
Seneca, PI.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
Bittle v. Bahe, 193 P.3d 810 (Okla. 2008).
Seneca, PL's Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Br. in Supp. at
Id.
Seneca, Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1-4, 8.
Id. at 6.
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
Seneca, Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6.
Id.
Id.
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intrastate communications facilities. . . ."303
B. The Trial304
In his opening statement, STC's counsel, Michael T. Torrone,305 outlined the facts
and series of events leading up to the filing of the lawsuit.306 Before calling STC's first
witness, Mr. Torrone stated that ". . . had White Loon Construction not acted in total
disregard for the property of others, and acted with an uncaring attitude of almost
arrogance ... we wouldn't be here today." 307 STC's first witness, Larry Prader, an
employee of STC for ten years, installed and repaired telephone lines.308 Mr. Prader
testified that, prior to the first line cut, White Loon was aware that STC had phone lines
in the area where they were excavating, yet it failed to call STC in order to locate the
lines before digging.309 During the defendant's cross-examination, Mr. Prader testified
that White Loon's behavior was not merely accidental, considering that White Loon cut
the lines "so many times, so close together." 3 10
STC's second witness, Mark Wyrick, worked for STC for 22 years installing and
repairing telephone lines. 3 11 Wyrick's testimony established that White Loon was on
actual and constructive notice that telephone lines were buried in the area where White
Loon was excavating.312 This notice was evidenced by pedestals visible in the area,
indicating a presence of buried cables. 3 13 Further, on cross-examination, Wyrick
revealed there were "buried cable" warning signs in the area displaying STC's phone
number. 3 14 Wyrick's testimony further established that White Loon breached its duty to
call STC in order to mark telephone lines before excavating. 3 15 According to Wyrick,
between the first and second cuts, White Loon never called STC to locate and mark
phone lines before continuing excavation.316 Wyrick asserted that on August 4, 2008,
White Loon cut the same line that was cut on December 4, 2007.317 This disregard for
procedure continued when White Loon did not contact STC in order to mark cables
303. Id. at 6, 7, 8.
304. For the sake of brevity, this section discusses only the plaintiff's portion of the trial. The defense set
forth their case at a subsequent date wherein the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Additionally, most of the
defendant's case is summarized in their motion for directed verdict or can be inferred from plaintiffs
testimony. Again, the most significant aspect of this case is that it survived the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Once the case went to trial, it was not difficult to establish a prima facie case of negligence and/or willfulness.
It is matters of law such as tribal sovereign immunity that the court will consider on appeal. The purpose of this
trial discussion is to give the reader a picture of the defendant's behavior and attitude during the events giving
rise to the lawsuit.
305. Michael T. Torrone is a recent graduate of the University of Tulsa College of Law and is currently
employed at Logan & Lowry, LLP located in Vinita and Grove, Oklahoma.
306. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at I1-13.
307. Id. at 13:1-6.
308. Id. at 22:1-15.
309. Id. at 29-30.
310. Id. at 35:10-14.
311. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument, at 37-38.
312. Id. at 45-49.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 72:4-13.
315. Id. at 52-57.
316. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 52-53.
317. Id. at 53:11-25.
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before severing yet another cable on August 11, 2009.318 Furthermore, this cable had a
pedestal providing White Loon with notice of the buried cable merely four feet from
where White Loon severed the cable. 3 19 Wyrick further testified that White Loon
eventually made a call to STC to come mark telephone lines before excavation
commenced,320 and he and Mr. Prader came to the work site to mark the lines. 32 1
Despite Wyrick's and Prader's marking, White Loon cut this cable on February 3,
323
2009.322 This was the same cable that White Loon severed in the second incident.
Wyrick suggested that White Loon's actions demonstrated that White Loon did not care
that they were consistently destroying STC's phone lines.324 When asked if he, as an
experienced excavator, would dig where lines were buried without first contacting the
3 26
appropriate entity,325 Wyrick answered that he would not.
327
STC's president, Jay Mitchell, was called as the plaintiffs final witness.
Mitchell testified that whenever an excavator damaged STC's line, he billed the
responsible party for the labor and materials required for repair. 328 Complying with this
procedure, Mitchell sent a bill to White Loon for damages from the first cut.329 White
Loon's lawyers responded that the company was not liable for the damage and would not
pay STC. 330 At that time, Mitchell retained Logan and Lowry, L.L.P., in order to
33 1
prosecute STC's claims against White Loon.
332
After Mitchell's testimony, White Loon's counsel demurred to the evidence.
The motion centered on the fact that STC was not a member of the One-Call Notification
333
White
System requiring that telecommunications operators register with this system.
Loon asserted that the purpose of this system was to provide a single phone number that
operators could call before excavating, and the One-Call system would send agents to the
excavation site to mark lines. 334 Based on this assertion, White Loon's counsel argued
that STC's failure to join the One-Call System constituted per se negligence, and
requested the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant based on STC's
comparative negligence. 3 35
STC responded that the statute authorizing the One-Call System336 did not issue a
318. Id. at 57:21-25.
319. Id. at 60:23-25.
320. Id. at 61:14-18.
321. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 62:14-18.
322. Id. at 64-66.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 103:22.
325. Id. at 103:23-25.
326. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 104:2.
327. Id. at 104:21-23.
328. Id. at 106:8-15.
329. Id. at 108- 12.
330. Id.
331. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 112:13-14.
332. Id. at 130:4-6.
333. Id. at 130:21-25.
334. Id. at 131:4-10.
335. Id. at 132:7-22.
336. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 142.3 (providing that, "Except for a municipality, all operators of underground
facilities shall participate in the statewide one-call notification center and shall have on file with the
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penalty for failing to join the system but instead created a benefit for registering with the
system. 337 If a company was registered with the system and any excavator damaged
underground facilities without first calling the One-Call System, that excavator was
strictly liable for the damage. 33 8 STC argued that because neither party received the
benefit of the statute, the resolution of the dispute fell outside its scope. 3 39 STC relied on
C. Wallace Construction Co. v. Western Steel Erection Co.,340 where the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled that contractors owe a heightened sense of duty to inspect the
premises on which they work. 34 1 Applying this ruling to the facts, STC argued that the
pedestals present at the excavation site placed White Loon on actual notice that there
were phone lines buried in the area. 342 Furthermore, prior testimony revealed that White
Loon employees had actual knowledge of the buried phone lines. 343 Lastly, STC
asserted that STC's failure to enlist in the One-Call System was irrelevant because White
Loon breached its duty to act prudently when inspecting the site, and White Loon
344
proceeded to excavate the site although they were aware of the buried phone lines.
34 5
read
The court found that the Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act,
in conjunction with C. Wallace Construction Co. v. Western Steel Erection Co., 346 made
it clear that White Loon breached their duty to contact STC in order to mark telephone
lines before White Loon excavated. 34 7 Accordingly, the court overruled White Loon's
motion for directed verdict. 34 8 The court subsequently rendered a verdict in favor of
STC. 349
IV.

ARGUMENT

Courts have long recognized that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity runs
counter to the spirit of American justice.350 Tort victims may not seek redress against
tribes or tribal entities. 3 5 1 Also, businesses and individuals cannot seek contractual
damages against tribes or tribal entities.352 Although the courts recognize and admonish
the doctrine, they refuse to abrogate the doctrine judicially, instead urging Congress to

notification center a notice that such operator has underground facilities, the county or counties where such
facilities are located, and the address and telephone number of the person or persons from whom information
about such underground facilities may be obtained. A municipality may, at its discretion, participate in the
statewide one-call notification center as provided for in this section or may provide information concerning the
underground facilities of the municipality as provided for in Section 9 of this act.").
337. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 135:8-14.
338. Id. at 135:14-19 (discussing OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §142.9a).
339. Id. at 137:3-7.
340. 380 P.2d 89 (Okla. 1963).
341. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 137-38.
342. Id. at 138:9-11.
343. Id. at 138:12-18.
344. Id. at 139-140.
345. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 142.1.
346. C. Wallace Constr. Co. v. Western Steel Erection Co, 380 P.2d 89 (Okla. 1963).
347. Seneca, Tr. of Oral Argument at 141:5-13.
348. Id. at 141:14.
349. Seneca, Journal Entry of J. at 1.
350. Fed. Sugar Ref. Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
351. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998).
352. Id.
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abrogate the doctrine statutorily. 353 This doctrine continues to harm non-Indians and
Indians alike, and there is no time like the present for American courts to put their
collective foot down and abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity, specifically when
tribes act in a proprietary capacity.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Potawatomi stated that all governments,
whether state, federal, or tribal, must be held accountable for their conduct. 3 54 The Court
also recognized that courts constructed the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity upon a
foundation of errant case law. 355 Stare decisis does not render these prior court
precedents immutable. 356 The courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, have
the power to overturn prior precedent as societal values evolve or when the court
determines that prior precedent is built on fallacy. 357 If this were not true, we would still
live in a society where public schools were segregated.3 58 With that in mind, the Kiowa
Court declared that "tribal immunity extend[ed] beyond what [was] needed to safeguard
tribal governance" in modem society. 359 Therefore, the courts have the power to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, and they should no longer defer to Congress.
Additionally, Roland Morris, Sr.360 and William J. Lawrence's361 testimony
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs revealed that the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity was detrimental to the well-being of many tribal citizens because
tribal governments were not held accountable for questionable conduct. 362
Consequently, non-Indian businesses are justifiably hesitant to conduct business with
tribal companies because they cannot seek redress from tribal companies for tort liability
or breach of contract.363 Therefore, abrogating the doctrine when tribes act in a
proprietary capacity will increase the net social and economic surplus for society by
facilitating more business transactions between non-Indians and Indian businesses. When
tribal companies face the same tort and contract liability as non-Indian companies, both
will find it more desirable to engage in business with one another, thus increasing
economic opportunities for tribal citizens and non-Indians. As tribal economic conditions
improve, social conditions will follow. When the amount of business transactions rise,
the economy grows and everyone gets a bigger slice of the economic pie. This freedom
to conduct business ultimately leads to a net social and economic benefit for society as a
whole.
Furthermore, the federal government and a majority of state governments already

353. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991). The
court in Cook recognized that "the Supreme Court has somewhat grudgingly accepted tribal immunity in the
commercial context." Cook v. Avi Casino Enter., 548 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2008) (Gould, J., concurring).
354. Potawatomi,498 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring).
355. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756-757.
356. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 924 (2007) ("[T]he Court does
sometimes overrule cases that it decided wrongly only a reasonably short time ago.").
357. Id.
358. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
359. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
360. Morris, supra note 183.
361. Lawrence, supra note 189.
362. Lawrence, supra note 189; Morris, supra note 183.
363. Anderson, supra note 9.
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abrogated their own sovereign immunities when acting in a proprietary capacity. 364In
1978, the Oklahoma legislature abrogated state sovereign immunity when the "state
engage[d] in a business normally carried on by private companies"365 and when the state
entered into a contract with a private person or entity.366 According to former Oklahoma
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hodges, "[w]e have no king and no claim of divinity for
3 67
our government has been asserted. Yesterday's excuses are not today's answers."
Based on this assertion, tribal nations ought to follow the state and federal model of
abrogation of their own volition. However, it is unlikely that tribal nations will
voluntarily surrender their immunity from suit; thus, court action is required. Despite the
obvious injustices incurred by tribal nations in the past, it is in the better interest of
society to not merely apologize for the past by creating an entitlement for some and a
burden for many, but to eliminate present and future injustices caused by tribal sovereign
immunity. Again, it is time for the courts to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity when
tribes act in a proprietary capacity.
Seneca368 demonstrated that White Loon's sovereign status unnecessarily
complicated the process of collecting damages from the responsible party. Although
Seneca appeared to be an open and shut case of negligence and/or willfulness, White
Loon forced STC to jump through unnecessary procedural hoops in order to collect a
relatively small amount of damages. Absent any sovereign immunity issues, a trial would
have been unnecessary. The Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Act holds all
excavators that damage underground facilities strictly liable for such damage. 369 White
Loon felt that its sovereign status shielded it from liability of any kind. This sense of
entitlement offers explanation as to why White Loon repeatedly severed STC's phone
lines. Any reasonable excavator, absent the cloak of sovereign immunity, would have
exercised proper, even reasonable, precautions preventing such negligence and liability.
Further, non-immunized excavators would likely take responsibility for their damages
instead of forcing the damaged party to resolve the issue judicially. Therefore, in the
interest of justice, the appellate court must affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Alternatively, the appellate court should affirm based on STC's preemption analysis
revealing that state courts have jurisdiction over intrastate telecommunications law.
Seneca provides the courts an opportunity to remedy an antiquated doctrine built
upon almost 200 years of errant precedent. The appellate court must consider whether it
is just to circumvent the constitutional rights of all citizens in order to preserve a doctrine
that provides a privilege to a relatively small number of citizens - a doctrine running
counter to the American spirit of justice. It is clear that preservation of this doctrine
enables tribal entities to continually injure citizens with impunity. Nothing in this
argument should be construed to mean that abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity
unjustly limits the rights of tribal nations. Abrogation of this doctrine would merely

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Berry, supra note 40, at 887.
Id. at 884-86.
Id.
Newman v. State, 490 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Okla. 1971) (Hodges, C.J., dissenting).
Seneca, Journal Entry of J.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 142.9a.
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place tribal corporations within the scope of rights granted to all American citizens.
Furthermore, abrogation of this doctrine will provide greater opportunities for tribal
nations to reap the benefits of increased participation in the private market. In order to
prevent future injustices caused by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the
appellate court must affirm the trial court's decision in Seneca.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the appellate court must affirm the ruling of Seneca and abrogate
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity when tribes act in a proprietary capacity for the
following reasons: 1) tribal sovereign immunity is a product of errant case law; 370 2)
courts have the power to overturn prior precedent; 3 71 3) it is unjust to grant tribal
corporations immunity from suit while they retain the right to sue; 372 4) tribal sovereign
immunity harms Indian and non-Indian citizens alike; 373 5) tribal sovereign immunity
decreases the net amount of economic transactions; 374 and 6) citizens have a
constitutional right to seek redress against those who injure them. 375 Judicial abrogation
of this doctrine benefits all citizens of the United States, Indian and non-Indian.
Alternatively, Congress should statutorily abrogate the doctrine. The evidence is
overwhelming that the doctrine outlived its purpose and only functions to deprive
individuals and businesses ofjustice and economic development. Also, tribes should take
the initiative to remedy this issue on their own. Self-abrogation will improve both social
and political relationships between Indians and non-Indians and provide more business
opportunities for tribal citizens. Finally, the courts should adopt a two-part test to
determine whether tribal sovereign immunity applies to a particular circumstance. The
test would ask:
1) Does the action against the tribe negatively impact the tribe's right to self-govern?
2) Does the action against the tribe negatively affect the tribe's sovereign status?
If both questions are answered in the negative, the tribe would not be immune from suit.
There are many solutions to reconcile the interests of tribal nations with the
interests of non-Indian citizens. A cooperative effort between tribal nations, the courts,
and Congress can yield a beneficial result for all. Now is the time to take the initiative.
The judiciary, Congress, and tribal governments have buried their collective head in the
sand for too long, and there is no time like the present to settle the issue, remedying an
injustice plaguing Indian and non-Indian citizens alike. Perhaps Thomas Hobbes, one of
the great champions of democratic thought and modern justice, said it best whilst
contemplating the dynamics of peaceful society: "That at the entrance into the conditions
of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right, which he is not content should

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756-757 (1998).
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, 551 U.S. 877, 924 (2007).
Fed. Sugar Ref. Co. v. U.S. Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F. 575, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
Morris, supra note 183.
Anderson, supranote 9.
Seneca, Order with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5, 6, 7, 8.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss3/6

26

Harp: One Nation - Reexamining Tribal Sovereign Immunity in the Modern
2011

ONE NATION?

475

be reserved to every one of the rest."376 For now, we can only hope that our nation's
lawmakers soon see fit to make this axiom a reality for all citizens, tribal or non-tribal.
-Bryce P. Harp

376. Thomas Hobbes, Of OtherLaws ofNature, in LEVIATHAN, CHAPTER XV (1651).
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